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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l a n t , : Case No. 860101 
- v - : 
MARK RENFRO, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
If the Court i s i n c l i n e d t o r econs ide r i t s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1) (a) ( iv) (Supp. 1983) 
(amended 1985) i n S t a t e v. Hicken. 659 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Utah 
1983) , t h e S t a t e ag rees with d e f e n d a n t ' s argument. I t c l o se ly 
p a r a l l e l s t he argument p resen ted by the S t a t e i n a p e t i t i o n fo r 
r e h e a r i n g in t h e Hicken case (a copy of which i s conta ined in t h e 
Addendum), which i s i nco rpora t ed by r e f e r e n c e h e r e . 
On t h e other hand, if t he Court does not reexamine 
Hicken. t h e evidence presented by the S t a t e in t h e i n s t a n t case 
c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d a v i o l a t i o n of § 58-37-8(1) (a) ( iv) as t h a t 
s t a t u t e was cons t rued i n Hicken. 
CONCLUSION 
If t h e Court were t o abandon i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n of § 58-
37-8(1) (a) ( iv) i n Hicken and adopt the p o s i t i o n s e t f o r t h in t h e 
S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n for r ehea r ing i n t h a t c a se , d e f e n d a n t ' s conduct 
admi t t ed ly would not f a l l w i t h i n t h a t p r o v i s i o n , and the 
d i smi s sa l of t he charge aga in s t him would be j u s t i f i e d * 
However, absen t an o v e r r u l i n g of Hicken, the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s order of d i smis sa l was e r r o r . 
RESPECTFULLY submitted t h i s £9- day of October, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON / 
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y that I caused four true and accurate 
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to be mailed by f i r s t c l a s s 
mai l , postage prepaid, t o Gregory M. Warner, Attorney for 
Respondent, .43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84603, 
t h i s ££• day of October, 1986. 
^'T&'U+jL ffi 
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ADDENDUM 
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Motion to Dismiss the Informat ion f i l e d by the S t a t e charqinq 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of a c o n t r o l l e d subs tance for v a l u e ; to w i t , 
mar i juana , a t h i r d - d e q r e e f e l o n y , in the Fourth J u d i c i a l 
D i s t r i c t Court, in and for Utah County, S t a t e of Utah, the 
Honorable A l l e n B. Sorenson , Judge, p r e s i d i n g . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
236 S t a t e C a p i t o l 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84114 
At torneys f o r A p p e l l a n t 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAHr 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant, : 
-v- i Case No. 183 21 
ROBERT HlCKENf 1 
Defendant-Respondent , : 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
The standard e s t a b l i s h e d by t h i s Court f o r 
determin ing whether a p e t i t i o n for rehear inq i s proper was 
expres sed in Brown v . P r i t c h a r d , 4 Utah 202 , 9 P. 573; r e h . 
d e n . , 4 Utah 2Q2, 294 , 11 P. 512 ( 1 8 8 * ) : 
• . • [To] justify a rehearing, a strong 
case must be made. We must be convinced 
that the court failed to consider some 
material point in the case, or that it 
erred in its conclusions, or that some 
matter has been discovered which was 
unknown at the time of the hearing. 
In Cumminqs v. Neilsen, 42 Utah 15^, 12^ P. 619, 624 (1913), 
the Court stated: 
To make an application for a rehearing is 
a matter of right, and we have no desire 
to discourage the practice of filing 
petitions for rehearings in proper cases. 
. . . [Al rehearing should not be applied 
for, unless we have misconstrued or over-
looked some material fact or facts, or 
have overlooked some statute or decision 
which may affect the result, or that we 
have based the decision on some wrong 
principle of law, or have either 
misapplied or overlooked something which 
materially affects the result^ I • • IT 
there are some reasons, however, such as 
we have indicated above, or other good 
reasons, a petition for a rehearing should 
be promptly filed and, if it is 
meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court (Emphasis 
added). 
The argument portion of this brief will show that 
this petition for rehearing is properly before this Court in 
that this Court in its decision issued February 4, 1983, 
overlooked certain elementary rules of English usage and 
principles of logic which materially affect this appeal and 
misconstrued S 5P-3"^-8(l) (a) (iv) in rendering its opinion. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent was charged with distribution of a 
controlled substance for value; to wit, marijuana, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann., « 5*-37-n(1)(a)(ii) (1QS3), as 
amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOV7ER COURT 
Respondent was tried before a jury on February 17, 
1982 in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson presiding. The 
trial court issued a final order granting defendant-
respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Information. 
-2-
RELIEF SOUGHT ON> APPEAL 
Appe l lan t seeks the gr ant ing of a rehear ing or a 
summary r e v e r s a l of t h i s C o u r t ' s February 1 4 , 1983 d e c i s i o n in 
t h i s c a s e . 
STA^EM^T OF TH*! FACTS 
On October 1*, 1Q81, respondent Robert Hicken was a t 
the home of j e r r y Middle ton in Provo, n t a h , hoping to meet a 
new customer to whom he could s e l l drugs (T. 1 3 ) . Mr. 
Middleton was working in c o o p e r a t i o n wi th Sergeant Paul 
Markling of the Provo C i t y P o l i c e Department (T. 1 3 , 28 , 3 2 ) . 
At some p o i n t in the day , Judy Smith, a Provo C i t y P o l i c e 
Department employee working for the d e t e c t i v e ' s d i v i s i o n , went 
t o Mr. M i d d l e t o n ' s home and was met a t the door by Mr. 
Middleton (T. 1 3 ) . Miss Smith was a c t i n g under the 
i n s t r u c t i o n s of Sergeant Marklinq and was to at tempt to buy 
some marijuana or c o c a i n e from a t h i r d p a r t y (T. 1 3 , 2R). 
Miss Smith did not know Mr. Middle ton , nor was she aware he 
was ac t inq in c o o p e r a t i o n w i th the p o l i c e (T. 240 . Mr. 
Middleton introduced Miss Smith to respondent (T. 1 4 ) . 
Respondent asked Miss Smith how much she wanted t o pur c has e , 
and a f t e r conf irming the p r i c e and q u a n t i t y with h i s "source" 
o v e r the t e l e p h o n e , respondent agreed t o s e l l her two baqs of 
marijuana for $95 (T. 1 3 - 1 5 ) . 
Respondent i n s t r u c t e d Miss Smith , Mr. Middleton and 
Mr. M i d d l e t o n ' s l i t t l e s i s t e r to g e t i n t o Miss Smi th ' s car and 
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fol low respondent in his car (T. 1 6 ) . At approximately 1100 
South and 50 East in Orem, respondent pulled over to the side 
of the road and asked Miss Smith to qo with him to complete 
the previously negotiated sa le while Mr. Middleton and h i s 
l i t t l e s i s t e r waited in Miss Smith's car (T. 1 6 ) . Respondent 
drove Miss Smith in h i s car to the home of h i s "source," Mr. 
Larsen (T. 1 7 ) . 
Once i n s i d e , respondent explained to Mr. Larsen that 
Miss Smith, not respondent, was to purchase the marijuana (T, 
1 7 ) . Mr. Larsen, followed by respondent, went into a back 
room for a few minutes (T. 1 7 ) . When they returned, 
respondent was carrying the marijuana. He examined i t , 
commented that i t was "rea l ly good stuff" and del ivered i t to 
Miss Smith (T. 1R-10, 26) . Miss Smith then paid Mr. Larsen 
S95# the previously agreed upon price (T. 1<*). 
Respondent drove Miss Smith back to her car (T. 20 ) . 
She drove Mr. Middleton and h i s l i t t l e s i s t e r back to the ir 
home, and then drove to the po l i ce s t a t i o n where she reported 
to Sergeant Markling and gave him the marijuana (T. 20 ) . 
At t r i a l , a f ter the State rested i t s case , 
defendant-respondent moved to dismiss the Information claiming 
that in l i g h t of the evidence produced by the S t a t e , 
respondent had been improperly charged under € 5R-37-R(l) (a) 
(jLi), the d i s t r i b u t i o n for value subsect ion , and should have 
been charged under 5 58-37-8(1) (a)(^iv) which defense counsel 
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characterized as the "arranging statute" (T. 3 3-36). The 
State reasoned that because Utah's aiding and abetting 
statute, C 76-?-2(92, provides that an aider and abettor mav be 
charged as a principal, respondent was, in fact, correctly 
charged because the evidence clearly showed that he had aided 
in the distribution of a controlled substance for value (T. 
3 3-37). Despite the State1s argument, the court ruled that 
the aiding and abetting provision, $ 76-2-202 of the Criminal 
Code, did not apply to the Controlled Substances Act and 
therefore respondent could not be found guilty of the crime 
charged in the Information (T. 37). 
Appellant appealed the final judgment of dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court*s opinion holds that respondent should 
have been charged with "arranging a sale" under Utah Code 
Ann., c; 5n-3"7-R( 1) (a) ( iv) (1953), as amended, and that Utah 
Code Ann., € 76-2-202 (1<>53), as amended, did not apply. The 
opinion is supported by the reasoning that the Controlled 
Substances Act expressly and specifically sanctions the 
offense of arranging for the distribution of a controlled 
substance and thereby displaces the general sanction for 
aiding and abetting provided for in € 76-2-202. In reaching 
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this conclusion, the Court has overlooked certain elementary 
principles of English usage and principles of logic which 
materially affect this appeal and has failed to discern the 
plain meaning of the statute, 
Utah Code Ann., C 5R-37-B(l)(a)(iv) (19 53), as 
amended, must be read in its entirety for its meaning to 
become manifest. It states: 
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it 
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly 
and intentionally: . . . 
(iv) To agree, consent, offer, or arrange 
to distribute or dispense a controlled 
substance for value or to negotiate to 
have a controlled substance distributed or 
dispensed for value and distribute, 
dispense, or negotiate the distribution or 
dispensing of any other liquid, substance, 
or material in lieu of the specific 
controlled substance so offered, agreed, 
consented, arranged, or negotiated 
(Emphasis added). 
For purposes of illustrative argument, subpart (iv) may be 
divided into three phrases, A, R and C. Phrase A includes: 
To agree, consent, offer, or to arrange to 
distribute or disperse a controlled 
substance for value 
Phrase A is connected, without punctuation, by the word "or" 
to Phrase B which reads: 
to negotiate to have a controlled 
substance distributed or dispensed for 
value 
Phrase B is connected, without punctuation, by the word "and" 
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to the final phrase of the statute, phrase C, which reads: 
distribute, dispense, or negotiate the 
distribution or dispensing of any other 
liquid, substance, or material in lieu of 
the specific controlled substance so 
offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or 
negotiated. 
Demarcated as explained above, subpart (iv) appears as 
follows: 
To agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute or dispense a controlled 
substance for value / or / to 
negotiate to have a controlled substance 
distributed or dispense for value / and / 
distribute, dispense, or negotiate the 
distribution or dispensing of any other 
liquid, substance, or material in lieu of 
the specific controlled substance so 
offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or 
negotiated (Emphasis added). 
When the subpart is read as it is interpreted in the 
Court's opinion, the "or" which appears between Phrase A and 
Phrase B is emphasized. So read, the subpart proscribes the 
conduct "A" and also proscribes the conduct "B and C." 
The "or" emphasized by the Court, however, is not 
the only connective used in the statute. There are many. One 
of equal importance is the first "or" found in Phrase C. One 
of greater importance is the "and" which appears between 
Phrases B and C. When the subpart is read as interpreted by 
appellant, this "and" in conjunction with Phrase C properly 
becomes the crux of the subpart. 
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Appel lant f s in terpreta t ion of the subpart i s that i t 
proscribes the condct "A and C" and a l so proscribes the 
conduct "B and C." This i s what the subpart savs when 
l o g i c a l l y read. The conduct "A" by i t s e l f i s not proscribed 
by t h i s subpart. That i s , an agreement, o f f e r , arrangement or 
consent to the d i s t r i b u t i o n or dispensing of a control led 
substance ^s not punishable by th i s subpart if standing a lone , 
contrary to t h i s Court's opinion. 
The reasons supporting appe l lan t ' s in terpretat ion 
are several and are based primarily upon rules of English 
usage and l o g i c as these d i s c i p l i n e s are related to the 
construct ion of the subsect ion . The f i r s t reason i s that 
there i s no punctuation between Phrase "A" and the "or" 
introducing Phrase "B." If there was a comma before the word 
"or", the Court's holding that Phrase "A" i s a separate 
criminal sanction independent of Phrases "B" and "C" might be 
c o r r e c t . This would be cons i s tent with the rule of English 
usage that requires that a comma be placed before a 
conjunction introducing an independent c l a u s e . The absence of 
a comma before "or" ind icates that Phrase A must be read in 
conjunction with Phrase C and i s not a separate criminal 
sanction in and of i t s e l f . 
The second reason i s that Phrase A i s stated in the 
conjunctive in r e l a t i o n to Phrase C. Although the "or" 
ind ica tes that Phrases A and B are stated in the d i s j u n c t i v e , 
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they are disjunctive only so far as they relate to each other. 
Phrase A is nonetheless stated in the conjunctive in relation 
to Phrase C, and similarly, Phrase B is stated in the 
conjunctive in relation to Phrase C. This is more easily 
understood if it is remembered that all three phrases follow 
from subsection (a) of the statute and are all dependent 
clauses. Absent punctuation indicating otherwise, the use of 
the word "or" does not divorce Phrase A from the remainder of 
the sentence. 
The third and perhaps the most compelling reason 
sustaining appellant's interpretation of the subpart involves 
the parallel structure of the statute. Phrase C incorporates 
all the essential language of both Phrase A and Phrase B (with 
the exception of the "for value" requirement) and also the 
"or" connecting those phrases. The "distribute or dispense" 
language of phrase A is paired, again by a disjunctive "or", 
with the "to negotiate to have . . • distributed or dispersed" 
language of phrase B. Ttiis language, identical in meaning, 
appears in Phrase C as "distribute, dispense, or negotiate 
distribution or dispensing." 
After the above reiteration, Phrase C adds its own 
operative language, that being: "any other liquid, substance, 
or material in lieu of." This is followed by the words "the 
specific controlled substance." This language of phrase C 
refers the reader directly back to its parallel, the "a 
controlled substance" lanquage found in both Phrase A and 
Phrase B. Such syntax is not mere coincidence• 
That Phrase A of the subpart cannot be read alone is 
also clear from the Legislature's inclusion of the language 
"so offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or negotiated" in 
Phrase C. "Negotiated," as the Court implied in its opinion 
in this case, clearly corresponds with "negotiate" as used in 
Phrase R. The words "so offered, agreed, consented, arranged" 
in Phrase C clearly correspond with the "agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange" language of Phrase A and are conclusive 
evidence that Phrase A and Phrase C are to be read together. 
This is the only reason language from Phrase A would be 
repeated in parallel form in Phrase C. If the subpart were to 
be interpreted as the Court has in this case, this expression 
of coordinate ideas in similar form would be unneeded, 
irrelevant and confusing. Thus, it is apparent that Phrase C 
was meant to be read in conjunction with either Phrase A or 
Phrase B as the circumstances of the particular case might 
require. 
Drafting the subpart in this way, so that it solelv 
applies where any other liquid, substance, or material in lieu 
of a specific controlled substance is involved, cannot be said 
to be myopic on the part of the Legislature. The subpart 
addresses one problem, that known in the vernacular as a 
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•turkey buy." It addresses the problem in terms of a person 
performing the distribution or dispensing necessary for the 
"turkey buy" himself, and in terms of the person negotiating 
to have another perform the actual distribution or dispensing. 
The subpart makes reference to both controlled and counterfeit 
substances only because providing a counterfeit substance in 
lieu of a controlled substance is the essence of a "turkev 
buy." "Arranging" for the distribution of a genuine 
controlled substance, as occurred in the facts of this case, 
is clearly proscribed by subpart (ii) of * 5B-3"J-R of the 
Controlled Substances Act and § 7^-9-002 of the Criminal Code. 
Section 76-2-202 is applicable to the Controlled Substances 
Act by way of Utah Code Ann.
 f $ "76-1-103 (1953), as amended. 
State v. Jeppson, Utah, 546 P.2d 894 (1976). Subpart (iv) 
applies only to "in lieu of" distributions and dispensings and 
is therefore not in conflict with a finding of criminal 
culpability under the agency theory. 
The Courtfs reliance on State v. Harrison, Utah, 601 
P.2d 922 (1979), in conjunction with its distinction of State 
v. Jeppson, Utah, 546 P.2d 894 (1976), is enlightening. In 
Harrison, at 293, this Court made the following statement in 
reference to subpart (iv) at issue here: 
A statute may leaitimately proscribe a 
broad spectrum of conduct with a very few 
words, so long as the outer perimeters of 
such conduct are clearly defined. The 
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statute in question accomplishes this by 
specifying that any activity leading to or 
resulting in the distribution for- value of 
a controlled substance must be engaged in 
knowingly or with intent that suc?fi 
distribution would, or would be likely to 
occur. Thus, any witting or intentional 
lending of aid in the distribution of 
drugs, whatever form it takes, is 
proscribed by the act (Emphasis a'dded). 
In the earlier case, Jeppson, the defendant was charged with 
aiding another because he had knowingly and intentionally made 
his trailer available to persons unlawfully possessing, using 
or distributing controlled substances therein. jTd. at 095. 
The Court upheld the use of an aiding and abetting instruction 
incorporating, in haec verba, the provisions of s "'fi-2-202 on 
the basis that: 
It is applicable here, because the 
Controlled Substances Act does not 
specifically provide otherwise, nor does 
its context require otherwise. 
Id. at R96. In its opinion in this case the Court further 
elaborated: 
There are no provisions in the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act dealing with the 
offense of providing a place for illegally 
selling drugs, and therefore the 
provisions of the Criminal Code may be 
resorted to. 
State v. Hicken, ntah, P.2d , filed Pebruarv 14, 
19R3# at 3 (1083). This distinction appears to be at odds 
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with the Court's declaration in Harrison, Unless one is to 
believe that providing a place for illegally selling drugs is 
not included in "any witting or intentional lending of aid in 
the distribution of drugs, whatever form it takes," Harrison 
and Jeppson are in conflict. That conflict, instead of being 
resolved by the Courts opinion in this case, is perpetuated 
by it. 
Appellant submits that this conflict would be 
effectively resolved if it were to apply the Jeppson precedent 
to the facts of this case and hold that respondent was 
properly charqed with Distribution of a Controlled Substance 
for Value in violation of Utah Code Ann., € 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
and that subpart (iv) of the statute applies only to sales 
involving substances distributed or dispersed in lieu of a 
controlled substance• 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoinq, appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court grant a rehearing in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of March, 1983. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Shelden F, 
Carter, Attorney for Respondent, 350 East Center Street, 
Provo, ntah, 84601, this nth day of March, 19H3. 
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